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COMMENTARY
THE PROPOSED TWENTY-SEVENTH AMENDMENT:
A BRIEF, SUPPORTIVE COMMENT
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the unratified Constitution of 1787 came before the state con-
ventions, one controversy more than any other nearly led to its rejec-
tion. The point of controversy concerned whether an additional effort
should be made prior to ratification to incorporate an enumerated list
of certain especially protected subjects into our fundamental law. In at
least seven of the states, a significant number of people pressed the ap-
propriateness of such amendments. Essentially, their view was that cer-
tain matters were so frequently the object of recurring disregard that
the Constitution itself should resolve the basic principles upon which
they rested; although persons might subsequently disagree whether
these principles would (or would not) permit a given kind of proposed
law, it was important nonetheless to resolve at least the general princi-
ples against which proposed departures must carry the burden of ade-
quate explanation.
In the first instance, the insistence upon these additions to the pro-
posed Constitution did not succeed. Rather, the prevailing sentiment at
that time denied the need for such a special listing and asserted, more-
over, that efforts to add to the Constitution in this way were both un-
wise and impractical. In the Federalist Papers' Alexander Hamilton
observed that insofar as such a list could not be of indefinite length, it
must perforce leave some things out of account. The result, he sug-
gested, would be confusing and misleading-an implication that any
subject not specially listed would be deemed wholly unprotected de-
* William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A., 1955, University of South-
ern California- J.D., 1958, Stanford University.
1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton). See also the remarks of James Wilson in the
Pennsylvania Convention, III M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 143-
44, 161-62 (1937).
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spite the settled understanding that only such subjects as had been ex-
pressly committed to the federal government were to be within the
national power. Against the practicality of the project, Hamilton also
noted that however such a list might be drafted, the language of the
draft would necessarily introduce uncertainties of its own-unavoida-
ble margins of substantial ambiguity that inevitably characterize any
provision sufficiently succinct to include in a constitu-
tion-uncertainties leaving much to doubt and inviting future quarrels
over interpretation that would be far better to avoid.2
These "eminently sensible" arguments easily prevailed at the Phila-
delphia Convention, and the original Constitution was submitted to the
state conventions essentially without a Bill of Rights.3 It came close to
failure on that account, probably succeeding only because of repeated
assurances that ratification would itself be quickly followed by prompt
consideration of additional amendments,4 as indeed it was with the rat-
2. For example, Hamilton was unenthusiastic about any efforts to provide for the protection
of a free press because:
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave
the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that
its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it,
must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of
the government. And here, after all, as intimated upon another occasion, must we seek
for the only solid basis of all our rights.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. at 514-15 (1961)) (footnote omitted).
3. The Constitution was submitted "essentially" (rather than literally) without a Bill of
Rights because, despite rejection in the Philadelphia Convention of efforts to secure a more com-
plete enumeration of particular rights, the original Constitution nonetheless did contain scattered
provisions affirmatively safeguarding certain rights. Eg., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9 & 10 (forbid-
ding ex post facto laws or bills of attainder and securing the privilege of habeas corpus); U.S.
CoNsT. art. III, §§ 2 & 3 (securing a right to jury trial in certain cases and restricting the definition
of treason); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (interstate privileges and immunities clause); US. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 3 (forbidding religious test oaths).
4. Reference to the several volumes of J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF TiE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTI ON (2d ed., reprinted by Lenox Hill Pub. & Dist. Co., 1974) confirm the sugges-
tion that in virtually every state for which there is any significant record of convention debate
(e.g., Virginia, North Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maryland), the ab-
sence of an additional Bill of Rights was a principal source of consternation and hesitation. North
Carolina declined to ratify until such time as some more satisfactory assurance was provided.
Virginia narrowly divided, id vol. 3, at 576, (in part bemused by an ambivalent letter from
Thomas Jefferson in which he declared that ratification by nine states was essential to guarantee
an effective union, and rejection by four states was essential to guarantee a Bill of Rights; the letter
did not indicate in which column Virginia should place herself, id. at 573). Virtually all of these
states asserted an expectation that additional rights would at once be guaranteed. Several states
accompanied their resolutions of ratification with an express call for the proposal of such
amendments.
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ification of ten (of a proposed twelve) amendments completed in 1791.
To a very considerable extent, some of Alexander Hamilton's criti-
cisms of those proposed additions to the Constitution have been en-
tirely fulfilled. The Bill of Rights is not a detailed code; most
assuredly, the applicability of many of its provisions to particular laws
or government practices has generated all manner of disagreement.
Consider by way of but one example the first amendment provision
that restricts Congress from making any law "respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," an amend-
ment subsequently deemed applicable to restrict the states by force of
the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment.5 We are some-
times still at odds with one another over what this provision means
and, more concretely, what kinds of laws touching religious interests
may be deemed compatible with the first amendment.6 A law forbids
homicide. It provides no exception even when the homicide is an exer-
cise of sincere religious zeal or a ritualistic offering of sacrifice reluc-
tantly committed as a doctrinally required demonstration of faith and
supplication. Yet the "conflict" between amendment and law is
scarcely worth a pause: we do not doubt that the law's determination to
allow no such exception will meet whatever burden of justification
someone might attempt to suggest is required by the first amendment.
(We may say, even as the Supreme Court has said, that, "[T]he [First]
Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot
be."7 ) In other instances, however, the burden of reconciling our laws
with the free exercise clause is not so easily dismissed; e.g., whether
snake handling can be forbidden as a religious practice,' whether po-
5. Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
o. The most recent and wel-publicized example is the proposal by Senator Helms of North
Carolina to deny jurisdiction to the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, over any case
arising under any state law relating to 'voluntary" prayers in the public schools. The notion is
that each of the fifty state supreme courts should make the final determination whether such activ-
ity violates the fourteenth amendment, regardless of any opinion by the United States Supreme
Court whose previous decisions on this subject Senator Helms believes to be mistaken and so
mischievous that the Supreme Court should be forbidden to review such matters in the future.
125 CONG. REc, S4128-31 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Helms), 125 CONG. REC.
S4138-57 (daily ed, Apr. 9, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
7 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (emphasis added).
8. Evidently, it may be forbidden See. e.g., Tennessee v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn.), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
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lygamy can be prohibited and monogamy installed as the sole licit kind
of marriage,9 whether ceremonial uses of mild hallucinogens can be the
subject of suppression, t° and whether compulsory education beyond
the eighth grade can be required even for the offspring of disaffected
sects. I I
Yet however unruly, difficult, and unwelcome these controversies
often may be, very few of us would be happier without the first amend-
ment. The Constitution surely would be a lesser document without it.
Like so much else in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights compels us to
measure our sense of the fairness of our laws and governmental prac-
tices by imposing a burden of explanation. Not in any sense a
blueprint of fine detail, it nonetheless lays down certain standards on
particular subjects deemed to be of sufficient importance to be featured
in our most fundamental law. Indeed, it is probably not too much to
say that the Bill of Rights-with all its controversy over its principles of
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, security of one's person and
home, security of private property from uncompensated appropriation,
fair trial, and limitations on tolerable punishment-is central to our
Constitution. Madison and Jefferson surely were right about this gen-
eral matter; it would have been a mistake to leave everything out of
account.
It is the remembrance of these things that prompts my introduction
to this very brief Commentary on the proposed twenty-seventh amend-
ment. For in the end, I have come to believe that approval of this
amendment provides the most appropriate answer to the same ques-
tions that were deemed sufficient to justify ratification of the earlier and
equally important amendments that constitute our Bill of Rights.
Those questions I think to be these three. First, is the subject of the
amendment of sufficient importance to warrant recognition in the Con-
stitution of the United States? Second, is the particular subject inade-
quately addressed in the Constitution? And third, does the manner in
which the subject is treated in this amendment fairly compare with the
essential style of the Bill of Rights itself? These are the questions that,
9. Apparently, to criminalize polygamy does not violate the free exercise clause; nor does
the installation of monogamy enact a dominant religious preference in violation of the establish-
ment clause. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
10. Possibly, they are not. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69 (1964).
11. Evidently, it cannot be so required. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
[Vol. 1979:189
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when answered to our satisfaction in the past, have produced the most
enduring and the most admirable parts of our Constitution. There is
little reason to think that they are not now as useful as they always
have been merely because the proposal at hand is the twenty-seventh
amendment rather than some other.
As right as this unstrained approach now seems to me, it is only fair
to acknowledge that I nonetheless have taken a very long time to reach
it. When the twenty-seventh amendment was proposed by Congress in
I972, I instinctively thought of the matter in quite a different way-that
until one could nail down every possible interpretation upon which
reasonable persons might disagree, it was both premature and unpro-
fessional to entertain any opinion about this amendment. In brief, the
chief question as it then appeared to me was not any of the three above,
but rather this: precisely what does this amendment mean, i e., exactly
what results are (or are not) to obtain in each kind of case that might
plausibly relate to or arise under it?1 2
The quest for clarification became a mild professional interest at the
12. This brief Commentary quite deliberately does not undertake to provide "still another"
interpretation of the twenty-seventh amendment. It does not do so because an approach to the
,ubject that takes seriously every kind of alleged result imputed to the amendment by those hostile
to it is doomed from the beginning. It might also appear to "protest too much" by gradually
becoming buried in an argumentative minutiae, enduring the futility of Sisyphus. Scarcely could
one conclude an elaborate response to one supposed danger imputed to the amendment than
another would at once be rolled down the hill to try one's labor again. Because the conjured evils
o the amendment are no more finite than the imaginations of persons opposed to the basic fair-
ness standard of the amendment itself, an approach to the amendment that begins so defensively
i bound to be unconvincing and, thereby, to fail. Again, that kind of approach to the first amend-
ment of our Constitution, to the fourth amendment, or to the eighth amendment-each one of
wA hich the reader is urged seriously to read again-would have left us with the legacy of Alexander
flamilton's preference, i.e., no Bill of Rights at all. At the cutting edge of the current dispute is
l/at very choice: whether to incorporate the enduring value of an important and articulate princi-
ple into our fundamental law, or to leave our Constitution vacant in a respect that we know leaves
it poorer.
A% an example of why I do not believe objections to the proposed twenty-seventh amendment
generally reflect an adequate understanding of how provisions unfit for a particularized statute
may nonetheless be entirely fit for a Constitution, it may be helpful to consider at least one princi-
pal objection. One objection stems from an anxiety that if the twenty-seventh amendment were
ratified, then men could not be made to serve in combat roles unless women were equally subject
to identical military service, i.e., as combat troops. Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold
appropriately expressed this concern:
[Pirobably the most serious questions in the minds of many persons is that of women in
combat services in the Armed Forces. And I venture to say that this is really at the heart
of much of the opposition which has finally arisen. Many persons, rightly or wrongly,
see this as a serious threat to the security of the United States.
Equal Righis Amendment Elyfension: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Civil and Const.
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beginning, a major distraction somewhat later, and by the fourth year
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 113 (1977-78) (statement of
Erwin Griswold).
Despite the tendency of some to assume that such a result is acceptable (ie., they see no serious
probable compromise of the war power even assuming this result were mandated by the twenty-
seventh amendment), many, myself included, do not share that easy confidence. Rumors to the
contrary notwithstanding, evidently no country deploys women in its combat infantry. Doubts
regarding the wisdom of doing so are by no means confined to male chauvinist pigs or to anti-
feminists. For a recent review, see Gilder, The Case Against Women in Combat, New York Times
Magazine, Jan. 28, 1979, at 29.
But the issue, so far as the twenty-seventh amendment is involved, is not whether under certain
conditions it might be desirable or even ultimately unavoidable to pursue that course, as indeed it
might; the issue is whether the twenty-seventh amendment would compel that result regardless of
a contrary desire by Congress. I am confident that it would not. Equal Rights Amendment Evten.
sion: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 150 (1977-78) (statement of William W. Van Alstyne).
It is quite true that one possible construction of the amendment would give colorable basis to a
claim that even in a wartime draft male combat troops could refuse to serve unless women were
subject to conscription for identical combat service. (The colorable basis for that claim evidently
is that insofar as women might not be subject to that form of military service, an "equality of
rights under the law" must necessarily mean that neither may men be made subject to that form of
military service.) Even reasonable attention, however, to Supreme Court interpretations of fully
equivalent provisions elsewhere in our Constitution, construed in light of the special force of the
several war powers clauses within the Constitution, should settle one's thoughts against the plausi-
bility of that wooden interpretation.
The first amendment is quite absolute in the expression of its central premise respecting one's
freedom of speech. Thus, it provides no enumerated list of exceptions to its general command that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." Despite that command,
however, the first amendment is acknowledged to be subject to construction in light of certain
enumerated powers of Congress including, most importantly, the war powers. Indeed the amend-
ment is not read to protect speech in disregard of all other circumstances even when the war power
-itself is not involved. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Despite the breadth of
the first amendment's command, in the first modem case in which it was drawn into question Mr.
Justice Holmes read it as subject to restraints of compelling justification. Thus, he observed that
"the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theater, and causing a panic." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Most pertinently,
he further observed:
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and
that no Court could regard as protected by any constitutional right.
Id
The power to prepare for and to engage in war is aggregated from a half-dozen explicit and
quite special provisions in the Constitution-from the powers vested in Congress in article I, § 8
(to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to make rules for the government of
those forces, to declare war), through those vested in the President in article 11 (as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States), to that stated in article IV, § 4 (providing that
the United States shall protect the states from invasion). Not only are these powers committed to
the Congress and to the President rather than to the courts, but the principal responsibility re-
specting the enforcement of the twenty-seventh amendment itself is also committed to Congress
rather than to the courts. Therefore, it is extraordinarily implausible, as well as remarkably unhis-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/21
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(when certitude was becoming even more elusive), virtually a sufficient
reason for perpetual agnosticism. Only more recently, nearly two years
after I laid aside this distraction to return to more general interests in
constitutional law, did it occur to me that the central premise of the
twenty-seventh amendment is really quite plain and that I had been
reacting with my characteristic mistrust of any proposal to amend the
Constitution. It also became quite plain that had equally hostile mis-
trust similarly characterized the disposition of Congress and of the sev-
eral state legislatures between 1789 and 1791, there never could have
been a sufficient consensus to "risk" the Bill of Rights itself. Most cer-
tainly, there never could have developed the national consensus essen-
tial to the enactment of the only other amendment that in any
fundamental way compares favorably with the Bill of Rights-the
fourteenth amendment.
Indeed, there is scarcely any portion of the original Constitution of
continuing significance that, as framed, could prevail over a general
fear that regards a constitution with the same anxiety of an impending
criminal indictment, to be attacked until such time as a detailed bill of
particulars should also be produced. Provisions most fit for inclusion
in a constitution are least appropriate for inclusion in a transient statu-
torical. to suppose that if the Congress and the President were mutually of the view that the
insertion of women into combat infantry was not appropriate to the enforcement of that amend-
ment, but rather, that such a step would senously compromise the related war powers entrusted to
Congress and to the President, then the Supreme Court would nonetheless presume to "overrule"
their combined judgment on both matters at once.
It has been observed by the Court itself that the power to wage war is the power to wage war
successfully. Lichter v. United States. 334 U.S. 742, 782 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 93 (1943). A far less defensible treatment of "equal rights" than a determination to avoid
the deployment of women in combat units has been sustained in the Supreme Court, even with
respect to persons set apart exclusively because of their race and made to endure extraordinary
hardships. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
None of this is to insist that Congress should necessarily exempt women from combatant train-
ing and combatant service, for without doubt there may be eminently reasonable differences of
opinion about the wisdom or need to do so. This is to say, however, that the twenty-seventh
amendment should not be thought to foreclose that judgment. The most zealous proponents of a
unisex combat infantry may find this outcome galling and even renegade. The most zealous pro-
ponents of absolute free speech, even speech that incites desertion under fire of the enemy, may
sometimes find the actual judicial interpretation of the first amendment galling and even rene-
gade. But each, albeit in respect to a different issue, is equally mistaken on how a constitution is to
be interpreted if they believe that courts will regard any amendment, or any other pan of that
constitution, as wholly unaffected by the structure and relation of other powers and provisions
within it.
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tory code. Each was not in the beginning and cannot even now be
framed to foreclose the future.
To agree with this much is not, of course, to counsel at once against
further reflection. It does, however, very much alter one's perspective
on the proper objects of that reflection. These objects, in the instance
of a proposed amendment, are the three substantial questions of consti-
tutional statecraft that have resulted in the defeat of petty or ill-advised
proposals assembled from some ad hoc distemper. They are also the
substantial questions of constitutional statecraft that have provided us
in the past with constitutional progress. In applying them to the pro-
posed twenty-seventh amendment, I believe they firmly operate to
commend its ratification. The subject of its concern is quite plainly of
sufficient importance to warrant recognition in our Constitution, it is a
subject most inadequately addressed elsewhere in that document, and
the manner in which its central premise is framed compares extremely
well with the manner that we have found most satisfactory in the past:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article.
II. A BRIEF GENERAL COMPARISON OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH
AMENDMENT
Since the adoption of the original ten amendments, sixteen addi-
tional amendments have been passed into law. The majority of these,
however, make only very limited revisions and lay down no very im-
portant principles. They are simply not comparable to the best known
amendments of the original Bill of Rights. The twelfth, twentieth,
twenty-second, and twenty-fifth amendments while, of course, not triv-
ial, principally effect adjustments in the selection and terms of office for
the President and Vice President. The sixteenth amendment merely
frees the levy of certain income taxes from an apportionment formula
previously required under article I. The eighteenth amendment "en-
acted" national prohibition-an adventure in abstinence that the
twenty-first amendment repealed.
In fact, there are probably only two amendments that compare in
significance with the original Bill of Rights. The thirteenth amend-
ment, which prohibits slavery, is undoubtedly one of these. Aside from
its importance, the occasion and necessity for its adoption are instruc-
[Vol. 1979:189
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live in two other ways. First, the thirteenth amendment is a permanent
and sober reminder that until its ratification, human slavery was itself
accommodated by other provisions within our own Constitution, 3 the
Bill of Rights notwithstanding. Second, it is also a most helpful re-
minder that the original Bill of Rights was itself by no means perfect,
that it left several important issues unresolved.
Slavery was one of these issues. The general protection of most fun-
damental civil liberties from abridgement by the states, not merely
from abridgement by the national government, was another. " An
amendment addressed to this shortcoming was adopted in 1868. Its
most important provisions state:' 5
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this Article.
This fourteenth amendment is itself now 111 years old. During that
time its remarkable and delphic passages-"due process," "equal pro-
tection," "privileges and immunities"-have had an extraordinary ca-
reer. On the one hand, the privileges and immunities clause was
immediately interpreted by the Supreme Court in a manner virtually
depriving it of any significance whatever,16 an interpretation that al-
most surely would have amazed many of its principal sponsors. On the
other hand, its remaining clauses-the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses-have been construed to include an astonishing assortment
13. More precisely, although the word "'slavery" never appears in the Constitution, it was
very carefully accommodated and protected throughout the entire document. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2, cl. 3 (apportionment of Representatives); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cls. 1 & 4 (importation of
such persons" guaranteed until 1808; capitation or other direct taxes to be imposed on same
apportionment formula as Representatives [five "other persons"-meaning slaves-to count as
three free persons]); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (constitutional duty of each state to return run-
away slaves); U.S. CONST. art. V (precluding any amendment prior to 1808 that would alter some
of these pro-slavery clauses).
14. The Bill of Rights, of course, was a set of restrictions that operated only upon the United
States and imposed no limitations upon the states. Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
15. U.S. CoNs. amend. XIV.
16. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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of more particular subjects ranging all the way from laws mandating
racial apartheid 7 to laws fixing the retail price of milk at nine cents a
quart 8 , an interpretation that might likewise have startled many of its
sponsors.
The sheer breadth of the fourteenth amendment readily distinguishes
it from all others enacted since the original Bill of Rights. Indeed, that
breadth distinguishes the amendment from nearly all of the original
Bill of Rights as well. Most of these, broad as they are, nonetheless
focus on identifiable subjects-whether so general a subject as freedom
of speech or so particularized a subject as the quartering of soldiers.
The fourteenth amendment is broader by far. It is also, by the same
breadth, much more indiscriminate.
In one sense this breadth may well be one of its virtues, quite apart
from the exhilarating role it creates for the judiciary. The sheer indis-
criminateness of its breadth, however, has also been a large part of its
greatest vice: an amendment that speaks so broadly to all possible sub-
jects of state action tends, in the same voice, to speak distinctly of none.
The resulting difficulty has long since become quite evident. Is there
but one standard of justification that all laws must meet insofar as they
affect "life, liberty, or property" or produce unequal degrees of "protec-
tion," or are there different kinds of standards that different laws, ad-
dressing different subjects of classification or regulation, must meet? If
some matters are more important than others, or if some kind of sub-
jects are not to be subordinated to the same kind of regulation or classi-
fication as are other kinds of subjects, how are courts to determine
which are which when neither the Constitution nor the fourteenth
amendment itself declares the distinction? Questions of this sort are
not merely the grist of law school courses in constitutional law. They
are at the center of judicial perplexity'9 and of our own perplexity as
well. They are the occasion for the more particular provisions of the
twenty-seventh amendment.
There is in our Constitution no identifiable provision directed to the
specific and recurring tendency to treat men and women unequally. In-
sofar as the fourteenth amendment is said to be such a provision, there
17. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled sub silentdo in Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956).
18. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
19. For a single, exquisite example of the difficulty, see the several opinions (covering 137
pages) in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
[Vol. 1979:189
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is nothing on the face of the amendment to suggest that the propriety of
this tendency is of any greater constitutional concern than the acknowl-
edged discretion of legislatures to favor some kinds of business activity
over other kinds, to distinguish between minors and adults, or to permit
some to sell land for a larger profit (e.g., for use as a gas station) while
limiting others to less profitable resales (e.g., for use as a single-family
dwelling).2" In brief, unlike most of the Bill of Rights, which register a
concrete solicitude for specific concerns such as freedom of speech or
religion, there is nothing in our fundamental law concretely commit-
ting us to the determination that "[elquality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex."
Actually, the contrary is more nearly true; so far as the Constitution
itself provides, the sole provision concerned with inequality of treat-
ment related to gender implies a general indifference to the question.
The nineteenth amendment addresses the issue of gender discrimina-
tion and provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation. 21
Insofar as this amendment addresses the subject, but solely forbids
such inequality as to voting, the most sensible inference is that the Con-
stitution is otherwise indifferent to gender-based laws-that all other
kinds of legal inequalities between men and women are of no greater
concern than the inequalities that may be imposed to distinguish adults
from minors, corporations from partnerships, opticians from ophthal-
mologists-and is content to cast all other matters back into the indif-
ferent net of the equal protection clause,22 the "usual last resort of
constitutional arguments."2'
To be sure, the indifferent generality of the equal protection clause
can be pressed into service. Indeed, as we well know, it has been
pressed into service. Since 1970 an unstable line of Supreme Court
20. See. e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976): Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955): Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 US. 365 (1926).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
22. Indeed, this was until quite recently the settled position of the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)
23. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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decisions has forced from that clause a special standard of equal pro-
tection for the review of laws that treat men and women unequally.
24
By patching together analogies based on the race-inequality laws2" that
were the particular, specific, and overwhelming object of the fourteenth
amendment,26 which gender-inequality laws were not,27 the Supreme
24. The unsteady adjustment of the equal protection clause to gender-related laws com-
menced with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). An effort to provide that case with a suitable post-
hoc rationale was immediately thereafter supplied in Gunther, In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court:.A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. I (1972). Virtually all
of the ensuing Supreme Court decisions are noted and reviewed in Ginsburg, Sexual Equali;
Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights.4mendments, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 161. During the current
term of the Supreme Court, the Court held that a state law exempting women from the possibility
of having to pay alimony (while subjecting men to that possibility) denies equal protection to men.
Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
25. The most elaborate effort to perfect this comparison appears in Mr. Justice Brennan,&,
opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See also Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal,
3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. (1971). Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
26. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873):
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be
called history. . .; [that] no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in [the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments], lying at the foundation of each, and
without which none of them would have been even suggested; ... the protection of the
newly made freemen and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exer-
cised unlimited dominion over him.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879):
It was in view of these considerations the 14th Amendment was framed and adopted. It
was designed to assure [black people] the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the
law are enjoyed by white persons ....
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1879):
One great purpose of these Amendments was to raise the colored race. . . into perfect
equality of civil rights with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the States. They
were intended to take away all possibility of oppression by law because of race or color.
27. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (state restriction of women
from the practice of law sustained); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (state
restriction of women from voting sustained). In neither case did plaintiff press the equal protec-
tion issue with vigor, but relied principally upon the "privileges and immunities" clause, just as
the plaintiffs had done in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The overall
evidence does not so much suggest that women were uniquely or even specially disfavored vis-a-
vis other kinds of plaintiffs seeking relief under the equal protection clause as it does suggest that
the clause was generally regarded to impose very little restriction on the police powers of the states
except in regard to the civil rights of racial minorities. See text accompanying note 21 stpra. See
also Mendelson, ERA, The Supreme Court, and Allegations of Gender Bias, 44 Mo. L. REv. I
(1979). The subject is additionally complicated, however, insofar as § 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment explicitly provides that states may lump women together with criminals and with males
under the age of twenty-one for purposes of disfranchisement without risking any loss of represen-
tation in Congress as otherwise contemplated by that section. Cf Richardson v. Ramirez, 418
U.S. 24 (1974) (disenfranchising convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles
does not violate the equal protection clause).
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Court has to that extent supplied by case law what we mutually under-
stand the Constitution itself to not supply: a distinct constitutional
boundary expressly directed to this independently important subject.
How satisfactory is the jerry-rigged, judicially improvised substitute?
Surely, "not very," from almost everyone's point of view. Instead of a
properly framed and duly ratified express provision appropriately ad-
dressed to this basic and recurring issue, we have enormously prolix
opinions from a badly divided Court struggling to explain why laws
that weigh unequally upon men and women involve a "quasi-suspect"
classification subject to a "middle tier scrutiny" under the fourteenth
amendment 2'-an amendment not framed to deal with this issue in any
particular fashion, nor aided by anything in the original Bill of Rights29
or any other part of the Constitution directed to the issue; an amend-
ment bogged down in judicial disagreement whether the Court has any
proper business in struggling so hard to supply what the Constitution
does not provide.
In brief, the problem with the fourteenth amendment as an adequate
substitute for the twenty-seventh amendment is basically the problem
of "The Emperor's New Clothes." On the Court's part, it may be an
entirely honorable gesture to avoid leaving the subject nearly naked.
On our part, it is entirely unworthy. The principle that "[e]quality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex" is an important one. It well
warrants an express place in our Constitution.3" That place is not
2o. For an recent example of a federal district court's exhaustive (and exhausting) recapitula-
tion (once again) of these matters, in which these inelegant phrases appear, see Felix v. Milliken,
463 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
29. As the Court has noted, "'The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of the First [Amendment], is much more
definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved." West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
30. An additional advantage reasonably to be expected from ratification of the twenty-sev-
enth amendment is a disentanglement of future analyses of gender-related laws from the very
imperfect and often confusing comparison currently made with race-related laws-an entangle-
ment currently encouraged by their common treatment under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Identification of gender-related laws to a separate constitutional provi-
sion should provide the basis for acknowledgment of distinctions that current "squeezings" from
other constitutional provisions tend to disallow or, at least, to make exceedingly awkward.
One such issue concerns "separate but equal" facilities, or "separate but equivalent" opportuni-
ties. Such a doctrine, offered in justification of laws mandating racial apartheid, is utterly unac-
ceptable under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956),
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), orerruling sub silentio Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
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properly filled by a mere cluster of unruly cases discoverable by
"Shepardizing" a fragment of the fourteenth amendment.
III. THE TIMELINESS OF APPROVAL
The twenty-seventh amendment is but a few votes short of approval,
principally for reasons of the very same kind that left the original Con-
stitution without any Bill of Rights at all-reasons of timidity and fear
that had they finally controlled the outcome of the Bill of Rights, would
also have spelled its defeat. Ironically, insofar as the amendment is
537 (1896). Governmental actions placing a cordon sanitaire (or "quarantine line") around the
lives of black Americans in the public sector and mandating an equivalent exclusion in the private
sector, see, e.g., Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), were the unworthy successors of
the more infamous Black Codes in the South and were the legal deposit of a more gentile racism
in the North. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); C. VANN WOODWARD, TiE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW (-). See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The tendency to maintain separate bathroom facilities, or even different athletic programs for
men and women, however, need not necessarily and may not ordinarily rest on sentiments of
animosity or fear by either side, and is not by any means either deliberately or inadvertently
disparaging of a full and genuine "equality of rights." That particular facilities may very well not
be so arranged-e.g., on buses and on airlines the self-same washroom is alternatively used by
men and women alike-is very far from the conclusion that whenever such facilities are provided,
someone is being denied an "equality of rights" on account of sex. To the contrary, in a variety of
circumstances the most genuine realization of such equality of rights may be fulfilled neither in a
unisex program nor in gender-segregated but identical programs, but rather in gender-responsive
equivalent programs. A single example may be helpful.
If a public school provides but a single varsity sport and that sport is football for which boys
and girls are all "equally" welcome to try out, the de facto consequence surely must be that all or
all but a few positions will be held by boys; girls will be foreseeably disadvantaged because of
gender. As well, if the same school provides "separate but equal"foolball teams as its sole orga-
nized athletic opportunity, surely the "equality of rights" thus provided to girls is likely to be
regarded as more derisive than genuine. When the normal range of both interests and abilities
characteristically differs, an accommodation of those differences in gender-specific ways need not
require mere "stereotypes" nor disparage the skill or competitive excellence of either men or wo-
men, but may approximate a fuller "equality of rights" than any plausible alternative consistent
with providing any kind of athletic program whatever. It is not supposed that the twenty-seventh
amendment forbids such programs. Neither should it be supposed that the validity of such pro-
grams, ie., whether they provide an "equality of rights," would be examined under the false light
of racial analogy, e.g., whether such a gender-based program may be compared with a program
that provides two football teams, one for whites only and the other for blacks only, or that pro-
vides two different kinds of teams, football for blacks only and tennis for whites only. Rather, the
advantage of the twenty-seventh amendment is to avoid this kind of comparison by disentangling
the consideration of gender-related arrangements from the frequently false analogy of the race
cases to which they are currently tied by fourteenth amendment analysis alone. In this respect, the
twenty-seventh amendment is not only an idea whose time has come, but also an amendment
whose ratification should prove positively helpful.
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now at risk, that risk arises not because the amendment has received
too little attention, but because it has received too much attention. Had
the language of the first amendment or of the fourth amendment or of
the fifth amendment been parsed, worried over, and scrutinized for
conceivable flaws to the same repetitive extent that has hostilely char-
acterized the protracted seven-year review of the twenty-seventh
amendment, it almost certainly would have produced such a confused
welter of differing explanations and interpretations that by sheer attri-
tion would have destroyed the whole enterprise-the same ennervating
ennui that threatens this amendment.
Most certainly, there are margins of ambiguity at the edges of this
amendment. There are also the suggestions of certain partisans, both
those in favor of and opposed to the amendment, who confuse the basic
issue by reading it with such wooden disregard as to forget that it is a
provision meant for a constitution rather than an internal revenue
code. Both are mistaken insofar as they suppose that courts will regard
any amendment or any other part of the Constitution with the same
insensibility as a procrustean bed. No conscientious state legislator
even reasonably familiar with the lack of rigidity that has characterized
Supreme Court interpretations of other amendments should entertain
concern that this amendment somehow might be treated differently,
i.e., that it will uniquely demand a rigidity of construction wholly in-
different to considerations of common sense.
Frankly, legislators who nonetheless wish for greater refinements
and more detailed elaborations in this amendment unfairly ask for
more articulation than constitutional principles can ever provide. They
also ask for more than we have previously found acceptable in other
important subjects charged with at least as much controversy as this
one, and for an elaboration that is even less likely to secure consensus
the more nearly it is made to resemble an administrative regulation.
To embark all over again, or to recast this amendment in an attempt to
list some factors or circumstances that might govern its meaning in
each possibly doubtful case, is plainly a misplaced enterprise.
The questions that now should be sufficient to answer are the same
questions that were sufficient to answer in the past. First, is not the
principle articulated in this proposed amendment unexceptional and
worthy of the Constitution? Second, is it not preferable to establish
clearly this principle in our Constitution than to rely upon the awkward
means by which legislatures and courts have attempted to develop
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cumbersome substitutes from the bare bones of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the fifth amendment,3" and the mere shadows of other clauses in
the Constitution? Third, is it not true that the manner in which the
proposed amendment addresses "equality of rights under the law"
compares very favorably with the manner in which other vital subjects
have been similarly addressed in the Constitution?
So very close to ratification are we, and so very far from any reason-
able likelihood that any other framing of the principle would be supe-
rior, that we need to be much less timorous and much more satisfied in
this accomplishment. Indeed, how strange people should feel some
years hence if the best they can say of their contributions to our funda-
mental law is that they assisted in the defeat of a constitutional princi-
ple that proclaims: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex."
31. According to its own terms, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is
not applicable to acts of Congress. The fifth amendment has no equal protection clause; nor does
anything else therein look even vaguely suitable as a textual substitute. Nevertheless, the fifth
amendment has been construed to limit Congress in the same manner as the states are limited by
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. See Karst, The Ffth Amendnentr Guarantee
of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REv. 541 (1977).
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